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Abstract 
 
That tax haven policies contribute to favorable economic growth in tax haven countries is 
commonly accepted.  There is, however, minimal empirical evidence to substantiate this 
assertation and empirical investigations are subject to endogeneity bias.  Using a sample of 155 
countries from 1982 to 2003, we find that the standard tax haven variable is endogenous to the 
error term in a typical growth regression.  We offer land area measures as valid instruments for 
tax haven status.  Results based on two-stage least squares estimation with heteroskedastic 
standard errors and controls for initial conditions provide support for the claim that tax havens 
“flourish” compared with non-tax haven countries. The sensitivity of the estimates to the 
treatment of endogeneity is salient for a variety of related research, including the current 
dialogue concerning the impact of tax haven policies on non-tax haven countries.  
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1. Introduction 
Tax havens attract disproportionate levels of capital: with less than one percent of the 
world population, they have 15.7 percent of the gross foreign assets of American firms (Hines, 
2005a).  Given the conspicuously favorable growth in tax havens compared with other countries 
(Hines, 2005a), tax haven policies are often touted as being beneficial for growth.  Support for 
this conclusion, however, is not well established due to the theoretical and empirical complexity 
of the relationship.   
Figure 1 highlights the connection between tax have policies and economic growth.  
Financial capital flows are a primary beneficiary of tax haven policies.
1
  Much of the tax haven 
literature focuses on the favorable flows of financial capital to tax havens.  Because the majority 
of financial capital inflows to tax haven countries flow back out to industrialized countries, 
attracting financial capital may have little bearing on capital investment and subsequent growth 
outcomes in tax havens (Rose and Spiegel, 2006).  Thus, as illustrated by the dotted line in 
Figure 1, the growth implications of attracting financial capital is unclear.  
Surprisingly few empirical studies investigate the empirical link between tax haven 
policies and economic growth.  Hines (2005a) offers one of the few empirical investigations 
suggesting that tax havens “flourish” in terms of economic growth.  Conclusions about tax haven 
impacts are suspect given the non-random assignment of tax havens among countries.  As 
illustrated in Figure 1, countries with favorable growth conditions, such as political and 
economic stability, good financial markets, and high concentrations of wealthy individuals, are 
more inclined to become tax havens (Johns, 1983, Palan, 2002; Dharmapala and Hines, 2006; 
                                                 
1 See for example, Grubert and Mutti (2000) and Hines (2005b). Examples of country specific studies include: Hines 
(1996), Grubert and Slemrod (1998), Rolfe et al. (1993), Rawlings (2005), and Christensen and Hampton‟s (2005). 
In terms of tax rate differentials, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006a,b) present a theoretical model and an empirical 
analysis which suggest that economic activity in tax havens is beneficial for nearby non-tax havens. For a 
comprehensive literature review on tax havens refer to Dharmpala (2008).     
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Hansen and Kessler, 2001; Hines 2007).  Given that these countries are more likely to have 
favorable growth anyway, estimates of tax haven impacts based on standard growth regressions 
are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias.   
We contribute to the research by showing that the tax haven variable is endogeneous in 
typical growth regressions and by offering land area measures as valid instruments for estimating 
tax haven impacts on growth outcomes.  Our analysis extends previous studies (e.g., Hines, 
2005a) by including more recent data, a longer time period (1982-2003), and a larger sample of 
tax haven and non-tax haven countries.  Like Desai et al. (2006a,b) we highlight that tax havens 
are nonrandomly distributed across the globe.  While Desai et al. (2006a,b) investigate the 
relationship between tax haven demand and non-tax haven growth, we focus on the growth 
benefits for tax havens themselves.  We find that estimated impacts are sensitive to the 
specification of endogeneity and that the popular view of tax haven policies being favorable for 
growth is supported when controlling for endogeneity.   
From an international policy perspective, it is important to understand who benefits from 
tax haven policies.  Our results suggest that tax havens experience beneficial growth outcomes 
relative to nontax havens even when accounting for endogeneity of tax haven status. 
 
2. A Little Slice of Heaven: Importance of Size in Tax Haven Determination 
Geographic size is recognized as an important factor in the non-random assignment of tax 
haven policies among countries.  Size operates via numerous avenues to contribute to favorable 
growth potential of small countries.  Low tax rates are found to be advantageous for small 
countries (Gordon, 1992; Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008; Bucovetsky, 
2007; Marceau et al, 2007; Althuser and Grubert, 2007; Clausing, 2007; and Winner, 2005).  In 
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addition, the expensive land and low population density afforded by a small country, attracts 
high income households who favor low income taxes (Hansen and Kessler, 2001).  Small size is 
also related to favorable social capital formation, (Palan, 2002; Hampton and Christensen, 2002; 
Armstrong and Read, 2000) and reliance on tourism (Christensen and Hampton, 2005).
2
  Tax 
havens also tend to have small open economies, which tend to have lower corporate tax rates 
(Clausing, 2008; Devereux et al., 2008; Devereux and Loretz, 2007; Ghinamo et al., 2007). 
These countries also focus on developing politically stable environments, strategic agreements 
with developed countries and adequate infrastructure (Palan, 2002;  Hampton and Christensen, 
2002; Dharmapala and Hines, 2006).   These size-related factors are associated with favorable 
growth prospects. 
Thus, observed favorable growth in tax havens may be driven by factors related to size 
rather than by (endogenous) tax haven policies.  Accordingly, it is important to control for 
endogeneity in standard regression framework.  In the following sections, we investigate whether 
size can be used as a valid instrument in a standard regression framework.   
 
3. Empirical Specification of Baseline Growth Regression 
 Following Hines (2005a) our baseline empirical specification is given as   
(1) iii ditionsinitialconhavenGDPAVE   )(210 , 
where AVE∆GDPi is the average over the period from 1982 to 2003 of the difference of the 
natural log in the yearly real gross domestic product per capita (GDP) for country i.
3
  The tax 
haven dummy, haven, is equal to 1 for tax haven countries as identified by Dharmapala and 
                                                 
2 Islandness of a place is related to the physical and socio-political factors of an island. Hampton and Christensen 
(2002) argue that in order to be able to develop tourism countries must have favorable infrastructure including a 
good transportation system, a variety of hotels and shops, and attractive climates. 
3 Specifically, ∆GDP i,t = ln(GDP i,t /GDP i,t-1) where GDP is calculated using the chain series method as reported in 
the Penn World Tables, Version 6.2 (Heston et al. 2004). 
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Hines (2006) and 0 otherwise.
4
  The logarithm of the population (POP) and GDP in 1982, as 
well as their squared and cubed values are used to control for initial conditions.
5
     
Our sample includes 25 tax haven and 130 non-tax haven countries for which data were 
available for the sample period, 1982 to 2003.   These are identified in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively.
6
  Our empirical specification differs from that of Hines (2005a) by using the log 
percentage change to measure relative change in GDP per capita, by including a longer time 
series from the recently updated Penn World Table data, and by including more countries (both 
tax havens and non-tax havens).
7
  The log percentage change measure offers advantages of being 
symmetric, normed, and additive (Törnqvist, Vartia and Vartia, 1985).     
The descriptive statistics given in Table 3 highlight the obvious differences between the 
tax haven and non-tax havens.  Over the sample period, tax haven countries tend to be smaller 
and enjoy greater growth compared with non-tax haven countries.   
 The baseline model estimates are given in column (1) of Table 4.  The estimated 
coefficient on the tax haven dummy is positive, very small, and statistically insignificant. The 
results are robust to the specification of the dependent variable (i.e., using percentage change in 
GDP) as well as the sample period (using 1982 to 1999) used by Hines (2005a).
 8
  Thus, we 
attribute our departure from Hines‟ (2005a) results of a positive estimated tax haven coefficient 
that is weakly significant to differences in sample composition and data revisions.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Dhamapala and Hines (2006) choose tax havens as countries that are identified in Hines and Rice (1994) and that 
reappear in Diamond and Diamond (2002).  
5 Population and GDP data were available from the Penn World Tables Version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2004). 
6 Dharmapala and Hines‟ (2006) Table 1 shows a list of 39 tax haven countries. We were able to obtain data on GDP 
for the period of analysis for only 25 countries in the list. 
7 Hines (2005a) uses a sample of 119 countries, including 17 tax haven countries, for the period 1982 to 1999 and 
measures the change in GDP as the rate of change, whereas we use log percentage change. 
8 These estimates are not reported for brevity.  
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4. Instrumental Variable Approach 
In the analysis of the impact of taxation policies on growth, it is important to note that 
taxation policies are likely to be endogenously determined in the growth equation. Dharmapala 
and Hines (2006) make a compelling case for the role of good governance in explaining which 
countries become tax havens. It is expected that favorable economic growth and good 
governance will be important determinants of tax haven status. For this reason, we consider 
important that the issue of endogeneity is recognized when analyzing whether tax havens 
outperform non-tax havens in terms of economic growth. Thus, we test for the endogeneity of 
tax haven status in the growth equation, provide valid instruments for tax haven status, and 
determine whether tax havens flourish once endogeneity is addressed for. 
We employ the Hausman test to investigate whether tax haven status is determined 
endogenously in the growth equation (i.e. the tax haven dummy is correlated with the error term 
in equation 1). For this test, we first regress the tax haven dummy on all the exogenous variables 
in equation 1 and the proposed instruments and obtain the residuals (estimates shown on Table 
A1). We recommend land area, land area squared, and land area cubed as valid instruments for 
tax haven status in the growth equation.
9
 Adding the residuals from this estimation to the 
baseline model, we find that the estimated coefficient on the residual is significant with a t-stat of 
2.37 and p-value of .019 (Appendix, Table A.2).  Accordingly, we can reject the null hypothesis 
that the OLS estimates are consistent and conclude that two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation is appropriate.
10
 
Two conditions must be met in order for land area, land area squared, and land area 
cubed to be considered a set of valid instruments. First, it is required that these instruments are 
                                                 
9 Land area data are expressed in square kilometers and are obtained from the CIA‟s World Factbook (2007). 
10 See Wooldridge for an explanation of this version of the Hausman test (2002, p.118). 
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exogenous in the growth equation, where these instruments need to be uncorrelated with the 
error term in equation 1. For the condition of exogeneity, it is obvious that economic growth has 
no influence on land area since land area is a geographic factor. As discussed before, land area is 
associated with country institutional characteristics, and these institutional characteristics are 
likely to be related to economic growth.
11
 Thus, it important for the exogeneity condition that 
land area does not have an independent effect on growth. The impact of country size on 
economic growth has been previously studied, where population is commonly used as measure 
of country size.  Easterly and Kraay (2000) show that smaller states do not show different per 
capita income growth, but show greater volatility on output growth. Rose (2006) argues that 
small countries are not systematically different from other countries in terms of economic 
development. It is suggested that small countries are likely to differ in relation to trade only 
(Rose, 2006).  Thus, it is unlikely that country size per see explains differences in economic 
growth across countries. 
In our analysis, we corroborate the exogeneity of our instruments with the over-
identification test, which is discussed below. Furthermore, running a regression of the residual 
obtained from the estimation of equation (1) on log of land area, land area squared, and land area 
cubed yields very small and insignificant coefficient estimates (results are shown in Appendix, 
Table A.3, column 1).  This suggests that our instruments can be taken as exogenous in our 
growth equation as specified in equation (1) and support their use as valid instruments in our 
analysis. 
The second condition for the validity of land area instruments is that they correlated with 
the endogenous variable, the tax haven dummy. In particular, we investigate the empirical 
                                                 
11 Hanson and Olsson (2006) find that there is a negative relationship between country size (using land area) and 
several measures of institutional quality (rule of Law, political stability, voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and corruption) 
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relationship between land area, land area squared, and land area cubed and the tax haven dummy 
variable using a Probit regression with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (Table A4, 
column 1).  The resulting estimated coefficients on the land area, land area squared, and land 
area cubed are significant with negative, positive, and negative coefficient estimates.  Thus, they 
are correlated with the tax haven variable as required for a valid instrument. We also test for the 
relevance of our instruments by performing a F test of the land area coefficients in the estimation 
with the tax haven dummy as dependent variable that includes all the exogenous variables in 
Equation 1 (regression estimates shown in Table A3). We reject the null hypothesis that these 
variables as a group have no explanatory power at the 1 percent level. We also use the Cragg-
Donald F-statistic test to check for the relevance of our instruments. We find that instruments are 
not weak as the F-statistic is equal to 12.75, which ensures that the bias of TSLS is no more than 
10% of the inconsistency of OLS (critical value is 9.08). Thus, we conclude that land area, land 
area squared, and land area cubed are valid instruments of tax haven status since they are 
exogenous in the growth equation and they are significantly related to tax haven status. 
We implement TSLS by regressing the tax haven dummy variable on the land area 
instruments, the control variables in equation (1), and a constant.  The predicted estimate of the 
tax haven dummy is then used in equation (1).  Estimates in column (2) of Table 4 show that the 
tax haven dummy coefficient is positive and significant (P=0.006).  Thus, treating endogeneity 
caused the estimated coefficient of the tax haven variable to become significant.  The magnitude 
of the impact of tax haven on economic growth is significant.  We observe that while a 
 8  
representative non-haven country experiences a growth rate of 1 percent, a representative tax 
haven country has a growth rate equal to 3 percent.
12
    
In the 2SLS estimation we use the over identification test to corroborate the exogeneity of 
our instruments.  For this test we take the residuals from the 2SLS estimates using the land area 
instruments and regress them on all the exogenous instruments. We fail to reject the null of over 
identification at the 5 percent level.
13
  Thus, this test supports the use of the land area variables as 
instruments for tax haven.  
 Due to the nature of our endogenous variable, the tax haven dummy, we consider an 
alternative estimator to the 2SLS. Although 2SLS provides consistent estimates even if the 
endogenous variable is not continuous, we explore whether our previous results are robust to a 
treatment-effects model. In this estimation we consider the „treatment effect‟ of low taxation in 
tax havens. This approach deals with the issue that there will be some omitted variable bias as 
taxation policies are highly correlated to other institutional characteristics associated with good 
governance. With the treatment effect, we intend to control for the bias arising from the 
uncontrolled differences related to the potential to attract capital between tax havens and non-tax 
havens. Results of the estimation of the treatment-effects model with a two-step consistent 
estimator are shown in Table 4, column 3. In this estimation, we find evidence that there is a 
selection bias, which suggests that the treatment selection models are adequate. We find that the 
tax haven dummy is significant at the 1 percent level and the magnitude of coefficient is greater 
than the one found with the TSLS. 
                                                 
12 Economic growth for the representative non-haven country has been estimated using the mean values of the 
independent variables for non-tax havens. To calculate economic growth for the representative tax haven country we 
use the mean values of the independent variables for tax haven countries.  
13 The R-square from this regression is 0.035, where the test statistic is 5.44. The critical value for the chi-square 
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom at the 5 percent level is 5.99. Therefore, with a P-value of 0.07, we fail to 
reject the null of over identification. 
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Other Instruments 
 Dharmapala and Hines (2006) analysis suggests that tax havens are well governed and 
are better governed than non tax havens.  We investigate whether good governance, as defined 
by Dharmapala and Hines (2006), could be used as a valid instrument for tax haven status in our 
growth regression.  The estimation results to determine the validity of the governance indicator 
are given in the second columns of Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4.
14
  As noted by Dharmapala 
and Hines (2006), good governance is likely to be related to past economic growth, which is 
what we find.  Thus, the good governance variable is not a valid instrument for tax haven status 
in our growth regression, and cannot be used as in independent variable.  We also find that good 
governance and land area are negatively correlated.
15
  Thus, the predicted positive relationship 
between growth and tax haven status (using land area instruments) may reflect the role of good 
governance on growth as well as that as the tax haven status.  Separate identification of good 
governance effects and tax haven policies are elusive given that both are related to each other as 
well as to past growth.   
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Because taxation policy is likely to be endogenously determined, it is important to 
develop a model that accounts for the non-random selection of tax haven status.  Our analysis 
documents the endogeneity of tax haven status and demonstrates the sensitivity of standard 
growth regressions to the problem.  We do not find a statistically significant relationship between 
economic growth and tax haven status in our baseline estimation that does not account for 
                                                 
14 In Appendix Table A.1, column 2 shows that the governance index in 2004 has an explanatory power in the 
determination of tax havens.  In Appendix Table A2, column 2 shows that governance is endogenously determined 
in the growth equation.   
15 The correlation between land area and the governance index is equal to -0.303. 
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endogeneity.  In contrast, we find, using a set of land area variables to instrument for tax haven 
status, that tax haven status has a positive and significant coefficient in our 2SLS estimation.  
Our results suggest that tax havens outperform non-tax haven countries, and that this result is not 
driven by endogeneity of tax haven policies or initial conditions. 
Addressing the endogeneity of tax haven status is important for policy-relevant research 
focused on the international taxation of capital.   In particular, if tax havens are well governed, as 
documented by Dharmapala and Hines (2006), and good governance leads to favorable growth, 
then international debates focusing on “fixing” international tax rate differentials may be 
misguided.  Furthermore, to the extent that a host of underlying exogenous factors are related to 
past and future economic growth as well as government policies, investigations of growth 
impacts of particular policies are impacted by endogeneity concerns. 
More research is needed to better understand what it is about tax havens that leads to 
favorable growth and the extent to which favorable taxation contributes to growth.  Along these 
lines, Dharmapala and Hines (2006) include a rich set of socio-political and geographical factors 
in analyzing tax haven determinants.  We offer a set of land area variables as potential factors for 
such investigations.   
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FIGURE 1: Endogeneity of Tax Haven Status 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Tax Haven Countries in Analysis* (n=25) 
 
Antigua Luxembourg 
Bahamas Macao 
Bahrain Maldives 
Barbados Malta 
Belize Netherlands Antilles 
Bermuda Panama 
Cyprus Singapore 
Dominica St. Kitts & Nevis 
Grenada St. Lucia 
Hong Kong St. Vincent & Grenadines 
Ireland Switzerland 
Jordan Vanuatu 
Liberia   
 
*Source: Tax Havens identified in Dharmapala and Hines‟ (2006) Table 1.  Dharmapala and 
Hines identified 14 other tax haven countries for which no data are available – Andorra, 
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Gibraltar, Isle 
of Man, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos 
Islands. 
Government   
Policies 
(Tax Haven) 
Attract 
financial 
capital 
 
Economic 
growth 
Exogenous factors  
- natural amenities 
- locational advantages 
- historical factors 
  15  
Table 2 
Non-Tax Haven Countries in Analysis* (n=130) 
 
Afghanistan Ecuador Lesotho Samoa 
Algeria Egypt Madagascar Sao Tome and Prin. 
Argentina El Salvador Malawi Saudi Arabia 
Australia Equatorial Guinea Malaysia Senegal 
Austria Ethiopia Mali Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh Fiji Mauritania Solomon Islands 
Belgium Finland Mauritius Somalia 
Benin France Mexico South Africa 
Bhutan Gabon Micronesia Spain 
Bolivia Gambia, The Mongolia Sri Lanka 
Botswana Germany Morocco Sudan 
Brazil Ghana Mozambique Suriname 
Brunei Greece Namibia Swaziland 
Burkina Faso Guatemala Nepal Sweden 
Burundi Guinea Netherlands Syria 
Cambodia Guinea-Bissau New Zealand Taiwan 
Cameroon Honduras Nicaragua Tanzania 
Canada Hungary Niger Thailand 
Cape Verde Iceland Nigeria Togo 
Central African Rep. India Norway Tonga 
Chad Indonesia Oman Trinidad &Tobago 
Chile Iran Pakistan Tunisia 
China Iraq Palau Turkey 
Colombia Israel Papua New Guinea Uganda 
Comoros Italy Paraguay United Arab Emirates 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Peru United Kingdom 
Congo, Republic of Japan Philippines United States 
Costa Rica Kenya Poland Uruguay 
Cote d`Ivoire Kiribati Portugal Venezuela 
Cuba Korea, Dem. Rep. Puerto Rico Zambia 
Denmark Korea, Republic of Qatar Zimbabwe 
Djibouti Kuwait Romania  
Dominican Republic Laos Rwanda  
*Note: Countries for which data are available from 1982 to 2003 in the Penn World Tables, 
version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2004) 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
 
  Tax Haven Non-Tax Haven All Countries 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. 
GDP 1982 10,290 7,437 6,688 7,856 7,269 7,880 
Population 1982 1,112 1,724 31,979 111,022 27,000 102,250 
Area 18,469 32,991 810,203 1,784,667 682,504 1,659,368 
Ln(GDP 1982)  8.95 0.82 8.21 1.12 8.33 1.11 
Ln(pop. 1982) 5.90 1.52 8.71 1.93 8.26 2.14 
Ln(area) 7.61 2.41 12.07 2.10 11.35 2.70 
AVE∆GDP 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Dependent Variable: AVEΔGDP 
n=155 
 
  OLS TSLS Treatment 
Constant 2.403 1.855 2.108 
 (0.553) (0.566) (0.576) 
Tax haven dummy 0.004 0.029*** 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(population 1982) 0.022 0.016 0.046*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Ln(population 1982)
2
 -0.004* -0.003 -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(population 1982)
3
 0.0002*** 0.0002 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Ln(GDP 1982) -0.908*** -0.702*** -0.833*** 
 (0.202) (0.208) (0.211) 
Ln(GDP 1982)
2
 0.112*** 0.086*** 0.103*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
Ln(GDP 1982)
3
 -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.237 0.123  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
 „***‟,‟**‟, and „*‟ indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 
Dependent Variable: Tax haven dummy 
n=155 
 
  OLS 
Constant 15.876 
 (6.689) 
Ln(population 1982) 0.619** 
 (0.315) 
Ln(population 1982)
2
 -0.077** 
 (0.036) 
Ln(population 1982)
3
 0.003** 
 (0.001) 
Ln(GDP 1982) -5.7653** 
 (2.4807) 
Ln(GDP 1982)
2
 0.726** 
 (0.305) 
Ln(GDP 1982)
3
 -0.030** 
 (0.015) 
Ln(area) -0.417 
 (0.280) 
Ln(area)
2
 0.023 
 (0.027) 
Ln(area)
3
 -0.0004 
 (0.0008) 
R-squared 0.474 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
„***‟,‟**‟, and „*‟ indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table A.2 
Dependent Variable: AVEΔGDP 
n=155 
 
  OLS 
Constant 1.855 
 (0.524) 
Tax haven dummy 0.029*** 
 (0.011) 
Ln(population 1982) 0.016 
 (0.016) 
Ln(population 1982)
2
 -0.003 
 (0.002) 
Ln(population 1982)
3
 0.0002* 
 (0.0001) 
Ln(GDP 1982) -0.702*** 
 (0.194) 
Ln(GDP 1982)
2
 0.086*** 
 (0.024) 
Ln(GDP 1982)
3
 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
Residual -0.031** 
 (0.013) 
R-squared 0.267 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
„***‟,‟**‟, and „*‟ indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table A.3  
Dependent Variable: Residual 
n=155 
 
  OLS OLS 
Constant -0.001 0.000 
 (0.030) (0.001) 
Ln(area) 0.002 -- 
 (0.010)  
Ln(area)
2
 -0.0001 -- 
 (0.001)  
Ln(area)
3
 -0.000001 -- 
 (0.00003)  
Governance Index -- 0.007*** 
  (0.002) 
R-squared 0.026 0.106 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
„***‟,‟**‟, and „*‟ indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Table A.4  
Dependent Variable: Tax haven dummy 
n=155 
 
  Probit Probit 
Constant 53.190 -1.153 
 (19.199) (0.141) 
Ln(area) -17.598*** -- 
 (6.484)  
Ln(area)
2
 1.897*** -- 
 (0.706)  
Ln(area)
3
 -0.068*** -- 
 (0.025)  
Governance Index -- 0.576*** 
  (0.152) 
R-squared 0.473 0.126 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
 „***‟,‟**‟, and „*‟ indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
